Volume 25 Number 55
Produced: Wed Dec 25 21:30:22 1996
Subjects Discussed In This Issue:
Administrivia
[Avi Feldblum]
A question on Ki Setze (2)
[Chana Luntz, Zvi Weiss]
Birchat Chama vs Harath Olam; 2 sources for Jewish Calendar
[Russell Hendel]
Detached Retina and Shofar Blowing
[Matthew Yarczower]
Geneological Chart of the People in Tanach
[Tirzah Houminer]
Scheduling the Mashiah
[Yeshaya Halevi]
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Avi Feldblum <feldblum@...>
Date: Wed, 25 Dec 1996 21:24:56 -0500
Subject: Administrivia
As mentioned in one of my administrivia's yesterday, I will be sending
out one "archive" edition of mail-jewish from submissions I have
uncovered in my mbox that I think are still of interest. So here is
today's:
Avi Feldblum
Shamash Facilitator and mail-jewish Moderator
<mljewish@...> or feldblum@cnj.digex.net
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Chana Luntz <heather@...>
Date: Sun, 29 Sep 1996 22:16:15 +0100
Subject: A question on Ki Setze
In message <199609080307.XAA15756@...>,Akiva Miller writes
>
>In Ki Setze (Dvarim/Deut. 22:23-27) the Torah teaches about two
>situations where a betrothed woman has sexual relations with a man other
>than her husband. In one case, where the incident occurred in a city,
>the Torah tells us to presume that if the woman had protested, someone
>would have rescued her, and so we presume that the woman had these
>relations willingly, and so both she and the man are put to death. In
>the second case, where it happened in a field, the presumption is that
>she did protest, but no one heard her, and so she is held innocent and
>only the man is put to death.
>
>This question was asked by a friend of mine, and we and several others
>cannot find an answer to it: Under normal circumstances, the Jewish
>court cannot convict a person of a capital crime unless *prior* to
>commission of the crime, the witnesses had warned the individual(s) that
>this act is forbidden and subject to the death penalty. Under such a
>system, how could a case arise where there is any uncertainty as to
>whether she protested or not? How could there be a case where we need
>the Torah to teach us that under *these* circumstances she is presumed
>guilty, but under *those* circumstance she is presumed innocent. Where
>were the witnesses?
I don't think there is a need to ask - where were the witnesses -
because this, like so many of the death penalty cases in the Torah, is,
for the reasons you have just cited, not actually something that would
ever reach a beis din. The more critical question is Why does the Torah
teach about this question in this manner?
What is learnt by the talmud from this section of the Torah is that one
is obligated to save somebody who is being pursued by a would be
murderer, even if it means killing that pursuer (Sanhedrin 73a). How
does the talmud derive this? From the pasuk 'Ain Moshea la' There was
none to save her (Devarim 22:27) 'Because if there had been one to save
her, he would be obligated to do everything possible to save her. (And
then it goes on to learn that the fact that in the pasuk 'to the girl
thou shall do nothing, there is in the girl no sin worthy of death'
(22:26) the word is written Na'ar (male) even though it is pronounced
Na'ara (female) teaches that the same rule applies if somebody is
chasing after a man to do a homosexual act, - and the discussion goes on
to darshan from that pasuk the rule set out in the Mishna on the top of
the page as to the other situations in which one is permitted to stop an
averah being done by killing the person attempting to perpetrate the
crime and where one is not so permitted - ie attempted murder - yes -
bestiality, avodah zara and chillul shabbas - No).
Note also from the Sifri: You might think - in the city she would be
guilty and in the field exempt - the Torah teaches 'there was no one to
save her' - if there was one to save her whether in the city or the
field she would be guilty and if there was no one to save her, whether
in the city or the field she would be innocent.
But you still might ask - why would the Torah ever need to make this
distinction (whether it is between city and field or between crying out
and not) if the death penalty could never be implemented without
witnesses? I can think of two halachic situations that potentially make
the question relevant. The one is where we are not dealing with a
Na'arah meorasa [engaged girl], but with a betulla [virgin] who has
either been raped or seduced - and the question is what is the nature of
the fine to be given to the father (which changes depending on which it
is). The Rambam states (hilchos na'arah betula 1:2) that if the act
occurred in the field, there is a presumption (chazaka) that it was
rape, unless proven otherwise, and if in the city, a presumption of
seduction. The Rivaad there questions what possible difference this
could make, as witnesses are necessary to force him to pay the fine in
any event, but the Migdel Oz comments that if the witnesses were too far
away to see if it was rape or seduction, but close enough to see that
the act actually occurred the question to could be relevant.
The other situation I could think of (although I have been unable to
find any reference to this perek in the discussions around this topic,
and wonder if anybody out there is aware of whether or not the question
is ever raised) - is when we are still dealing with a Na'arah Meorasa,
that is an engaged girl, (I am using the English term engaged to mean
one who has had erusin but not yet nissuin, not the present day meaning
of engaged which has no halachic status). This raises two possible
halachic questions - one a question of issur v'heter - is she permitted
to go on to marry her chossan? If she was forced there is no problem
completing the wedding. On the other hand, if it was adultery, what is
required is a get. The second question is one of dinnei mamonos - if a
get is given (whether because it is required or because they decide to
call it off) what is the correct amount of the ketuba. If she was forced
while she was engaged it stays at 200 zuz - if it was adultery, she does
not get her ketuba.
The reason why I raise these as separate questions is because the tests
for dinnei mamonos and dinnei issur are not necessarily the same.
Anyhow, as a result of these questions of mine, I went for a bit of a
hunt over yom tov - but have to confess I am no nearer finding a
conclusion. The most relevant discussion I could find was Even HaEzer
siman 68 (S.A. Si'if 9), which discusses the situation where a new
husband turns up at the beis din and claims that his wife was not a
virgin - and where she claims, no I was not at the time of the marriage,
but this is because I was raped. The halacha as laid down in the
Shulchan Aruch is that she is permitted to her husband (leaving aside
cases where she was betrothed at less than 3 years old or where he is a
Cohen). The nosei kellim (and the Tur) say that this is because she has
a certain claim [bari] against a possible claim [shema] and there is a
double sufek [doubt] in the situation (she might have been forced while
they were engaged (erusin) and it might have occurred before they got
engaged) coupled with a migo [possible stronger alternative claim that
she could have advanced but didn't]. However the nosei kellim
[commentators] on the Shulchan Aruch add that in relation that there is
a loss of ketuba, since there is only one sufek in relation to the
ketuba. The beis Yosef there also brings in the question of rov
[majority](interestingly claiming that rape is not common - I wonder if
this would change as society changed) and also that there is a kol to a
rape and hence a chazaka [presumption]. However in my brief scan (and I
certainly did not work through the issue in depth, which is why the
above is a bit sketchy), I did not see any discussion of the Rambam's
chazaka derived from the Ki Tetze pasukim being referred to in this
context. So my question is - is anybody aware of a discussion that
considers whether these pasukim create a chazaka that would interelate
with these sufekim and the bari plus migo versus shema claims? And if so
how? (Because I have to confess I am a bit stuck as to where to go
next).
Regards
Chana
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Zvi Weiss <weissz@...>
Date: Sun, 15 Sep 1996 21:47:32 -0400 (EDT)
Subject: Re: A question on Ki Setze
> From: <Keeves@...> (Akiva Miller)
> In Ki Setze (Dvarim/Deut. 22:23-27) the Torah teaches about two
> situations where a betrothed woman has sexual relations with a man other
> than her husband. In one case, where the incident occurred in a city,
> the Torah tells us to presume that if the woman had protested, someone
> would have rescued her, and so we presume that the woman had these
> relations willingly, and so both she and the man are put to death. In
> the second case, where it happened in a field, the presumption is that
> she did protest, but no one heard her, and so she is held innocent and
> only the man is put to death.
>
> This question was asked by a friend of mine, and we and several others
> cannot find an answer to it: Under normal circumstances, the Jewish
> court cannot convict a person of a capital crime unless *prior* to
> commission of the crime, the witnesses had warned the individual(s) that
> this act is forbidden and subject to the death penalty. Under such a
> system, how could a case arise where there is any uncertainty as to
> whether she protested or not? How could there be a case where we need
> the Torah to teach us that under *these* circumstances she is presumed
> guilty, but under *those* circumstance she is presumed innocent. Where
> were the witnesses?
Please refer to the Netziv in Ki setze on the verses in question. He
not only discusses the basic case in the text AND relates it to a
disagreement between in the Rishonim, but the Netziv actually draws some
"practical" conclusions from the matter... With out going into detail,
the case is one where the witnesses show up AFTER the "action" has begun
but BEFORE it has ended and neither party at that point is "interested"
in paying attention to the "warnings" of the witnesses.... In other
words, witnesses were NOT "present" *at the beginning* but LATER show
up...
Zvi
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: <rhendel@...> (Russell Hendel)
Date: Thu, 3 Oct 1996 19:57:41 -0400
Subject: Birchat Chama vs Harath Olam; 2 sources for Jewish Calendar
Rick Turkel [V25n6] inquires why HARATH OLAM refers to Tishray as the
creation of the world but nevertheless Bircath Chama revolves around the
sun returning to its original position in Nissan.
The simple answer is that the Jewish calendar has two conflicting
sources. Very roughly, the lunar months and years start in Tishray when
the world was created while leap years are depedent on when Spring and
Pessach fall out which according to Ex 12,1 is connected with Nissan. A
complete account may be found in Rambam, Calendar laws, 6-10. Some
details are as follows
THE LUNAR PROBLEM: The lunar month is about 29.5 days; but we cant start
a month in the middle of the day (6:5, and 8:1). The SOLUTION is to make
full and empty months (e.g. 8:6)--some being 29 and some 30. This
requires calculating when the lunar conjunction occurs and these
CALCULATIONS start from the first lunar month in the first
Tishray(6:15,10:3).
THE SOLAR PROBLEM: Just as a month cannot start in the middle of a day
so too the solar year---when the earth returns to its original
position--cannot take place in the middle of a month(9:1). The SOLUTION
to this problem is to make leap and non leap years(6:10). This requires
calculating the position of the sun against the background of stars and
this calculation always starts from its position in Nisan(10:3). The
reason for this is because the court had to decide when to make a year a
leap year to e.g. let Pesach coincide with the spring (10:6).
The SOLAR CYCLE--the time required for the sun to return to its original
position is 28 years. The LUNAR_SOLAR cycle--the time required for a
pattern of leap and non leap years with full and deficient months to
return to its starting point (with a 1-2 hour error) is 19 years.
I hope this clarifies the matter. Incidentally, similar problems and
resolutions exist in most other cultures.
Russell Hendel, Ph.d., ASA, rhendel @ mcs drexel edu
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: <myarczow@...> (Matthew Yarczower)
Date: Mon, 16 Sep 1996 08:46:11 -0400
Subject: Detached Retina and Shofar Blowing
A friend developed a detached retina. He raises the question whether it was
induced by his shofar blowing which he has done for many years. The detached
retina is on the same side as his blowing. His father, also a shofar
blower, also developed a detached retina. Does anyone reading this know of
any other similar cases?
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Tirzah Houminer <tirzah@...>
Date: Mon, 16 Sep 1996 22:35:35 +0200 (IST)
Subject: Geneological Chart of the People in Tanach
At a recent study group of which I a member a question arose pertaining
to the progeny of Moshe Rabaynu, Aside from the mention in the torah of
his two sons Gershon and Eliezer, we could find no other children or
grandchildren (neither in the Torah nor in Divray Hayamim.).
While looking through Divray Hayamim we came across occasional wives,
and second wives, and once in a while a daughter, but usually only sons,
and onccasionally a name that repeated itself several generations after
its first mention. This led us to wonder if anyone had eveprepared a
geneological chart, computer generated or otherwise of the people in the
tanach.
Would be very grateful for info on any of the above. Thank you
Tirzah Houminer, Alon Shvut, Gush Etzion.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: <CHIHAL@...> (Yeshaya Halevi)
Date: Wed, 11 Sep 1996 12:50:09 -0400
Subject: Scheduling the Mashiah
Shalom, All:
Eli Turkel <turkel@...> wrote:
<<In the 13 principles at the end of the prayers most people say "be
ve-at ha-masheach be-kal yom she-yavoh">>, that we anticipate the
Mashiah's coming every day. However, Eli noted, <<it is known that the
Messiah can not come on every day of the year for example shabbat,
fridays etc. Instead there should be a pause before she-yavoh. Thus we
wait each day that the Messiah should come, not necessarily today but we
still wait in anticipation.>>
But:
1. When it's Shabat in one part of the world, it can be after
Shabat in another part of the world, thanks to such things as time zones
anf the International Date Line. So can we not indeed await his arrival
on any day?
2. Mashiah's arrival will bring universal peace. Since it is
permitted for us to violate the Shabat to save just one life, why can't
Mashiah come even on Yom Kipur, when his arrival will save many lives?
Yeshaya Halevi (<Chihal@...>)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
End of Volume 25 Issue 55
