Volume 30 Number 25
Produced: Tue Nov 30 6:47:50 US/Eastern 1999
Subjects Discussed In This Issue:
Previous Generations (3)
[Chaim Mateh, David Charlap, Avi Feldblum]
Tenaim
[Michael Poppers]
Where would you like to live? (2)
[dwenger, Michael Poppers]
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Chaim Mateh <chaimm@...>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 1999 20:20:36 +0200
Subject: Re: Previous Generations
>>Something that a Gadol did in the past that rasies questions as to its
validity, without that Gadol ever having explained the Hallachic background
for what he did, is NOT Torah she'be'alpeh. It is an inexplicable action
by a Gadol. <<
<<Then you believe the gadol violated halacha. There is a concept of
ma'aseh rav.>>
It means that we don't know if that Gadol did what he did as a
bi'di'eved or as a le'chatchila, for example. We don't know the exact
circumstances under which the Gadol decided to do what he did. If the
gadol never explained what and why he did what he did, can we infer a
lechatchila Hallacha from his inexplicible action?!
<<As there may be multiple halachic reasons why the gadol paskened that
way, it is true that we do not know which one he accepted. However, by
acting that way, we can accept that he accepted this as being muttar.>>
We can accept that he accepted it as muttar under the circumstances that
he was in. Circumstances that we don't know exactly.
<<Let me ask: I ask rav A whether mixed swimming is allowed, and he says
yes. I don't ask rav B, but I go to the beach with him. Why doesn't
either one of these constitute a public statement that this is muttar? Do I
need a detailed analysis of why this does not violate hilchot erva to know
that this rav does not think that it violates hilchot erva?>>
Ummm, I dare say that an explanation is indeed needed.
<<Much of the gemara and rishonim is filled with stories about rabbanim who
acted in ways that seemed against the standard halacha. Even though we
don't always rule in accordance with those actions, those actions are
accorded respect, and the rav is assumed to have his reasons. Ma'ase rav
does have halachic status.>>
As you wrote, the Hallacha was usually if not always not like those daas
yochids who did this out of the norm.
<< Thus, the famous aruch hashulchan who says that today, because women no
longer covered their hair, uncovered hair is no longer erva for the sake of
tefilla (even though he still requires hair covering). Much of the
machloket in the literature is that to the extent to which these actions
are described as erva in classical sources, the erva is meant to be taken
objectively versus to be one governed by social norms.>>
But the Aruch Hashulchan himself says that it's a di'orayso (Biblical)
obligation for a married woman to cover her hair. The non-erva issue
was regarding saying Shma. This does not change the Hallacha regarding
her Biblical obligation to cover her hair.
<<It seems that those who permitted and even did those actions felt that
these were subjective ervas, and social norms changed.>>
I'm still searching for "those who permit" it. (See below).
>>The classic example is the (in)famous non-hair-covering by the wives of
some Gedolim of the previous generations. I know of no Tshuva that
Hallachically allows such a thing (the Boyde article notwithstanding,...<<
<<You can infer one of two things. i) The gadol ruled that it was
permitted. 2) The gadol thought it was assur, and allowed his wife to
transgress an issur d'oraita. Somehow, the second opinion seems to be
motzi la'az. >>
I was told by someone who studied by the gadol whose wife went hair
uncovered, and he related the story of how a (chutzpedik) student asked
the Rav whether it's permitted for a married woman to go hair uncovered
(knowing very well that the Rav's wife went hair uncovered). The Rav
answered: "It's not grounds for divorce". Read how the Aruch Hashulchan
bewails the sorry state of observance of this very Hallacha (hair
covering). If a Gadol feels that a clearly di'orayso Hallacha is
permitted lechatchila, then yes, a Hallachic justification is indeed in
order. If it is not given, then we can indeed NOT infer ANYTHING about
what that Gadol ruled about the issue.
It's clear (to me at least) that the Gedolim of then (and in Lithuania)
knew quite well that uncovered hair was a Torah prohibition, but could
not do much about it (for whatever the reasons), except divorce their
wives, which they felt they couldn't or didn't have to do.
<< I do not recall all the tshuvot that permit it, nor do I have access
here to Rav Broyde's article, but I remember there is a Yad Halevy
(perush on rambam's sefer hamitzvot) which explicitly says it, as well
as a tshuva by one of the Mashash family from Morocco. Therefore, there
are clear opinions to the contrary. You may not like them, nor think
the authors authoritative enough, and wish to rule otherwise. However,
there are sources.>>
I have heard so many times that "there are sources", but have never ever
seen one, nor sent one when asked. I will repeat my request again, to
anyone who has a Hallachic source that permits lechatchila a married
woman to go hair uncovered. It would also be interesting how many and
who the few sources are, if there are any such. IOW, if all of the
known accepted and authoritative Poskim say that it is Biblically
forbidden, and one or two daas yochids say it's permitted (assuming
there are such), can we give equal weight to the 1% as to the 99%?
Isn't it misleading to even imply that the 1% can be accepted as
practical Hallacha?
<< This attitude of being willing to judge others, even gdolim, as being
wrong because we do not understand them is I think contrary to halacha.>>
I don't think they were wrong. I just think that we just don't have
enough information about what, where, how, and why they did what they
did, in order to make sweeping Hallachic rulings based on their
unexplained actions (unexplained by the Gedolim, although others seem to
think they _can_ explain their actions).
<< The casual description of the normal, everyday actions of the wives
of some of our gdolim as "infamous" is, unfortunately, only too common,
and no longer shocks us as it should.>>
I again point you to the Aruch Hashulchan's bewailing the actions of the
women of his day in Lithuania. And when I wrote "infamous" I was more
referring to the misuse of the actions of the Gedolim's wives and the
inaction of the Gedolim.
Kol Tuv,
Chaim
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: David Charlap <shamino@...>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 1999 11:41:37 -0500
Subject: Re: Previous Generations
Meir Shinnar wrote:
> As there may be multiple halachic reasons why the gadol paskened that
> way, it is true that we do not know which one he accepted. However,
> by acting that way, we can accept that he accepted this as being
> muttar.
Under all circumstances? Probably not.
> Let me ask: I ask rav A whether mixed swimming is allowed, and he
> says yes.
I doubt you'd get a firm answer to that question. You might get an
answer if you'd ask something more specific like "can I go to the beach,
where women are also swimming". In which case, that "yes" would
probably be taking many other things into consideration, including:
- what the rabbi knows of you, personally
- the particular beach's reputation
- who you are going with
and possibly other things. I don't think you could possibly accept that
"yes" answer as a blanket statement for everybody.
> Do I need a detailed analysis of why this does not violate hilchot
> erva to know that this rav does not think that it violates hilchot
> erva?
Depending on outside circumstances, it is possible that the same actions
are OK in one situation and not OK in another.
There is a commonly known gemara (sorry, I don't know the source) which
states that a chicken, with a certain kind of blemish, is considered
kosher for a poor person, but not kosher for a rich person. If
everything is as objective as you're implying, that halacha should not
exist. Either the bird is kosher or it's not. But that's not the
case. Extenuating circumstances having nothing to do with the bird are
factored into the decision.
Similarly, we can expect that a rabbi, when making a decision for a
specific person in a specific situation (which may include his own
family) is _NOT_ giving his opinion on what everybody should be doing in
every situation.
-- David
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Avi Feldblum <mljewish@...>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 1999 20:14:20 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Re: Previous Generations
On Mon, 29 Nov 1999, David Charlap wrote:
> Depending on outside circumstances, it is possible that the same actions
> are OK in one situation and not OK in another.
> ...
> Similarly, we can expect that a rabbi, when making a decision for a
> specific person in a specific situation (which may include his own
> family) is _NOT_ giving his opinion on what everybody should be doing in
> every situation.
Taken to the logical extreme, this says that there cannot be any responsa
liturature, which assumes that one can ask a halachick question, receive
and "publish" a response to that question which then forms the basis for
subsequent halachick questions and answers. At the same time, the point
that at least at times, there may be answers to halachik questions which
are tailored to the individual who is asking the question and not meant to
be used as a basis for general applicability. When you have published
collections of responsa, where the responsa have been chosen by the author
for publication, we can take as assumed that the responsa were meant to
have general applicability. How, however, do we make that judgement call
with either "maaseh rav - known practices of a posek" or posthumous
collections of responsa?
Avi Feldblum
mail-jewish Moderator
<mljewish@...>
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Michael Poppers <MPoppers@...>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 1999 12:57:26 -0500
Subject: Re: Tenaim
In M-J 30#21, NTuttle replied:
> It is the "Litvaks" or non-Chasidim....at least in the Litvishe
(non-Chasidic) world. <
Just a small note (which the moderator, as always, is free to squelch as
being OT [off-topic (I think). No, it is worth pointing out that
"Ashkenazik" Jewry consisted of more than just the Litvaks and
Chassidim. Mod.]): "Litvishe" is not equivalent to "non-Chasidic," not in
general and not in this specific instance. At my and at modern-age (*)
Yekkishe weddings, there are no t'no'im (nor is there a "vort," or an
engagement party, or a shower... :-): precisely because the kiddushin
occurs just before the nissuin, there is no need for such an event.
All the best from
Michael Poppers * Elizabeth, NJ
(*) I have no idea as to what was done in German communities of old -- the
presumption is that t'no'im were not done then, either, at least so long as
the kiddushin and nissuin occurred on the same day.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: dwenger <dwenger@...>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 99 08:43:43 -0500
Subject: Where would you like to live?
Carl Singer raises a very interesting point in v.30#18 about the "ideal"
Jewish community. However, his list of criteria seems to be more a list
of criteria that would *disqualify* a community from being one in which
it would be ideal to live.
To rephrase Carl's very valid points (Carl, please correct me if I'm
misreading you), the "ideal" community, essentially, would be one in
which there was an atmosphere of tolerance and respect for one another -
for people with varying levels of observance, for both the old and young
(and one that Carl didn't mention, for singles as well as families, with
or without children).
Yes, there are some communities - Kiryas Joel comes to mind - that would
prefer everyone living there to be "the same" in all levels of
observance. For some people, this would probably be more comfortable. As
for me, I'd much rather live in a community that is open to all.
Fortunately, I'm currently living in one that is far from perfect, but
avoids - or tries to avoid - many of the pitfalls Carl mentioned.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Michael Poppers <MPoppers@...>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 1999 13:16:16 -0500
Subject: Re: Where would you like to live?
In Avodah 30#22, RFreedenberg replied:
> 2. Can we send the kids on the buses alone and can we leave our kids home
for awhile without fear that a stranger might knock on the door to do some
unspeakable damage?
I can already tell you that every community in America fails those two
and every community I know of in Israel passes with flying colors. <
I enjoyed your post overall but must disagree with this statement.
Certain parents may shelter their children more than others, or the kids
may have a need to use public transportation -- in any case, Jewish
children in America do ride the buses (and the subways, etc.) alone;
OTOH, I have to question whether the parents in *every* Israeli
community let their children ride buses without at least praying that,
r'l', no bullets or bombs intercept the vehicle. As for "leaving the
kids home" (which I assume, perhaps unfairly, means leaving them without
adult supervision), where I come from this practice is strongly
discouraged, if not against local law, because of what the children
might, r'l', do to themselves or to the property while "home alone";
even if you knew for a fact that no unsavory characters would knock on
your door, would you deliberately leave minor children alone in your
home (or, for that matter, your car) "for awhile"?
All the best from
Michael Poppers * Elizabeth, NJ
----------------------------------------------------------------------
End of Volume 30 Issue 25
