Volume 33 Number 73 Produced: Sun Nov 5 15:51:06 US/Eastern 2000 Subjects Discussed In This Issue: Blood Spots in Eggs [Robert Tolchin] Female Jewish Slave [Chana/Heather Luntz] Halachically Pregnant [Joshua Hosseinof] Source for SHITUF **NOT** Being Idolatry ? [Russell Hendel] ---------------------------------------------------------------------- From: Robert Tolchin <tolchin@...> Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2000 18:42:47 -0500 Subject: Blood Spots in Eggs Yesterday I was studying the laws of blood spots in eggs. The Shulchan Aruch discussion got me thinking. A central concern is whether the blood spot is the result of a chick forming or some other miscelaneous blood. THe rabbis discussed various approaches to determining this question based on the location of the spot with the egg. One opinion is that we cannot eat an egg that is found to have a blood spot regardless of where it was found because when it comes down to it we are not really experts in what blood spots are caused by a chick forming. Now, if modern science would allow us to definitively answer this question, for example by looking for certain things under a microscope or by using lab equipment to locate genetic material from a forming chick, we would have two new issues. On the one hand, we might be able to eat some eggs even if they have a blood spot just by removing the blood, since we could determine that a chick was definately not forming. On the other hand, one might argue that all eggs should be examined in a lab to make absolutely certain that no chick was forming. My study partner pointed out that generally kashrut laws and other halachot are not concerned with what cannot be seen with the naked eye. For example, we check lettuce for bugs that are big enough to see, and we are not required to examine lettuce with a microscope to look for tiny mites and bacteria. So, I ask: what would be the halacha of a) a cow; or b) a cucumber that had some pig DNA inserted into its genes. This might be done, for example, to give the cow or the cucumber some desirable properties, such as resistance to certain diseases. Would that cow or cucumber be kosher? It would look like a cow or cucumber, walk like one, talk like one, and satisfy all overt requirements of kashrut. Without examining the DNA, nobody would know about the pig DNA. If you saw the cow or the cucumber, you wouldn't know. Can you eat it? [This was discussed in some detail in volume 7, way back in 1993 when there was some discussion of inserting pig DNA into tomatoes. Mod] Also, I am contemplating putting together an anthology of chulent recipies. Anyone who would send me their favorite chulent recipie would be appreciated, and will get a free copy of the ultimate publication. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- From: Chana/Heather Luntz <Chana/<Heather@...> Date: Sun, 29 Oct 2000 23:01:20 +0000 Subject: Female Jewish Slave Apologies it has taken me so long to respond to this, I have been very busy, and only just caught up with back issues: In message <20000815104820.21546.qmail@...>, Chaim Mateh <chaimm@...> writes: >In vol 33#04, Moshe Nugiel <friars@...> wrote: > ><<I thank Chana Luntz for her well thought out and informative reply. If I >understand it correctly, the practical basis for female infanticide is the >following: "Boys are valuable because they can take over the land and work >it, girls tend to be a financial liability. " >Now my question is, what is the Torah's opinion about that dichotomy? >According to Chana's analysis, given that the Jews lived in an agrarian >society, and given the factual truth of the above dichotomy, the Torah is >interested in not having the girls killed at birth, and so it allows >the fathers to sell the girls instead.>> > >Did you understand Chana's remarks to mean that the _reason_ the Torah >permits selling a daughter as a servant for a few years, is as an >alternative to infanticide? First of all, while I certainly do not have the time or resources to go into details on the whole question of tamei d'mitzvos [the reasons for the mitzvos] and I am sure there are people on this list who can do a better job than I can. To grossly oversimplify a multifaceted debate, there are those who hold that we should not try and find reasons for the mitzvos, just taking them as as commands from HKBH and there are those who hold we are commanded to delve into reasons for the mitzvos. But even those who hold the latter, for something that the Torah does not itself give a reason, we must hold that the matter is overdetermined, that is, that there is unlikely to be only one reason, which is *the* reason for anything, it being much more likely that there are a whole complex of reasons, of which any given reason is only one. So I would never, ever, suggest that something is *the* reason (unless the Torah itself said so), what I may suggest is that something is *a* reason, with some reasons being more easily understood at a given time than another. This of course, explains why someone like R' Shimshon Raphael Hirsh gives one reason in his commentaries, while other commentators, eg Rashi, Rashbam, Ibn Ezra, might give totally different ones. > Unless I missed something, what is the Torah source for this theory? Giving reasons and explanations for the mitzvos is a time honoured form of parshanut. To give you a pretty modern but famous example, Rav YB Soleveichik gives an explanation for what might otherwise seem inexplicable, the two different creation descriptions in Breishis in terms of adam rishon and adam sheni. However, one should of course seek to ground any explanation in our sources, and have them be consistent with them. ><< What I would have liked the Torah to say (I know I'm treading on >dangerous ground here) is something like, "Since girls are also created in >the image of God, they need the same protection and nurturing which boys >need, despite the fact that they may be somewhat of a financial burden.">> This statement is falling into the trap that I indicated above. If you see something (anything) as *the* reason, there is a temptation to try and change the text so as to get it better to match that reason (for example, if I were to see Rav Soleveichik's reason as *the* reason, I could no doubt suggest "improvements" in the Torah which would make it more closely match that reason. On the other hand, if I understand it as only one of numerous reasons, then what this gives me is a better understanding of one aspect of why there are two creation stories in Breshis, but this does not take away from all the other reasons given which hinge on the precise language of the Torah, and would not be available if it were changed to particularly match this one reason. On the other hand, what Rav Solevichik's explanation does, is take away the justification of those who say - well there is no reason for there to be two creation stories, and hence try and use this to prove that the Torah is a text made up of different writings). >Where did the Torah (or Talmud, or anywhere) say that girls are >financial burdens? Try Vayikra 27:2-7 - in particular, read Rashi on pasuk 7, and deduce logically backwards what that means for the earlier verses. ><<Sort of like the Torah's protection of widows, orphans, and aliens;>> >Where does the Torah say or imply that the _reason_ to be good to >widows, orphans, etc, is because they are financial burdens? If you hold by the one extreme position that I mentioned above, that it is inappropriate to look for any form of reason for any of the mitzvos in the Torah, of course this is nowhere. On the other hand, while I did not bring this statement, it is pretty close to the surface as an explanation for why the Torah needed to elaborate in D'varim 15:7 - again see Rashi there (why otherwise might people harden their heart?), ><< What I have, instead, is the perpetuation of a sexist dichotomy, one >which teaches that since girls are physically weaker, it is OK to sell >them, just as long as you don't kill them.>> The sexist dicotomy runs throughout the Torah (take the case of Arechin I mention above). One of the bases of certain damages (see eg Baba Kama 83b) and vows is to find out how much would be paid for somebody on the slavemarket. The going rate depended on the individual, but was generally lower for girls/women than it was for boys/men. This may or may not be because girls are physically weaker (it may be because they are perceived as physically weaker, or because of societal constraints or for who knows what other reasons). You have to understand sale of minor girls (or the term I tried to steer you to use in my last post, adoption, because I think it is the English word closer to the real meaning of what is occurring) in that context and in the context of the Torah laws of inheritance, which passes to sons and only to daughters if there are no sons. ie you asked the question, why is it that adoption is permitted in extremis for minor girls and not for minor boys? I gave you *a* reason why it made sense for adoption to be permitted for minor girls and not for minor boys, because they are likely to be more vulnerable within an impoverished family (not just for outright killing, although that is clearly the extreme end of the spectrum, but for eg being the one who goes without if there is not enough food to go around, or scarcely enough). I tried to explain it within the wider context, and because most people have less access to what traditionally is and did go on historically, it is easier to point to what is going on today in other agrarian societies where the rules of inheritance are also through the sons. There is quite enough evidence of similar attitudes throughout our history, if you want to go into it, up until today. (To give you one trivial, modern example, when my husband (Sephardi) is called up these days (ie ever since he was married) the gabbai gives him a bracha for banim z'charim [male children]. Not just children, male children.) ><<Does this doctrine really make us a light unto the nations?>> >A _doctrine_?! A _Jewish_ doctrine? Couldn't someone first show how it >is a Jewish doctrine, before flying off the handle? I must say, doctrine is a bit strong, I was, in the time honoured tradition, positing an explanation. What we have is this - a Torah that specifies: a) inheritance goes to males in preference to females (but females must be supported out of the estate in preference to males, ie if there not enough to provide support for the girls and an inheritance for the boys, the boys miss out); b) that the arechin of a boy and man is defined as higher than that of a girl and woman; c) that one of the definitions of kibud av v'am [honoring mother and father] is of physically sustaining them - feeding and clothing them (kiddishin 31b, Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah siman 240 si'if 4), but while women are equally obligated in kibud av v'am with men when they are widowed or divorced, they are patur from the obligation while they are married (kiddushin 30b, Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah siman 240 si'if 17). If you are depending on your kids to provide you with sustainance in your old age (ie no government pension) which is likely to be a surer bet? d) that minor boys may not be sold/adopted, but minor girls may. You asked why d)? I gave you an explanation that tied it in with a), b) and c) - ie operates to balance out a) and b) and deal with possible side effects of c). If you are uncomfortable with this, it seems to me that you will also have an problem with a), b) and c) and your question needs to widen to include them all. Regards Chana ---------------------------------------------------------------------- From: Joshua Hosseinof <hosseino@...> Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2000 18:37:19 -0400 (EDT) Subject: re: Halachically Pregnant Rachel Smith Writes in v33n68 > The number of halachically possible days to expect the > period (which of course won't come during pregnancy) based on past > periods grows unwieldy very fast in those 3 months, and preventing > husband and wife from sleeping in the same bed (even without relations) > on all those halachically-possible nights would be unwieldy as well. I don't follow how the "veset" days grow during pregnancy in the first 3 months. There are 3 "veset" times during which relations are forbidden even without seeing a period and they are: 1. Hachodesh - the same hebrew date of the month as the last period occurred. 2. Haflagah - take the number of days between onsets of the last two menstrual periods, add this number of days to the date of the last menstrual period and this is the date when relations are prohibited. 3. Beinoni - 30 days from the date of the last period. In all the cases above if the last menstrual period occurred during the daytime, then the forbidden time period of the veset is also only during the daytime, similarly if the last menstrual period occurred during the night then the forbidden time period is also during the night (However some authorities hold that the time period before is also prohibited, so if the prohibited time period based on the veset is daytime, then the night before is also prohibited, and if the time period that is prohibited by the veset is night, then the daytime before is also prohibited - customs vary on this issue). All that being said - I don't see how the number of prohibited days grows during the first 3 months of pregnancy when the menstrual period does not occur. Obviously the veset hachodesh will occur only on the same day of the hebrew month as the last menstrual period. The Veset beinonit will occur at 30 day intervals from the last menstrual period. And the Veset Haplagah will occur at intervals based on the woman's own cycle, but still no more than once a month. So at worst case you would have 3 days of the month that relations are forbidden which is no more than you are likely to face during times when you are not pregnant. (I would also point out that not all authorities agree that sleeping in the same bed is forbidden during the veset - the only prohibition of the veset that everyone agrees on is actual intercourse itself.) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- From: Russell Hendel <rhendel@...> Date: Sun, 29 Oct 2000 21:30:50 -0500 (EST) Subject: Source for SHITUF **NOT** Being Idolatry ? My many Thanks to Kochav who in v33n68 gives about half a dozen sources for declaring ShITUF (Combining belief in one God with intermediaries) as Idolatry even for Noachides. My question is this--I know about the AUTHORITIES but I know of no REASONS. Does anyone know of ANY defense for any group (Jew or Non Jew) by which the deification of a human being (even in combination with belief in one God) should NOT be considered full fledged idolatry. Again I am looking for REASONS not AUTHORITIES Thanks Russell Jay Hendel; Phd ASA Dept of Math; Towson Moderator Rashi is Simple http://www.RashiYomi.Com/calendar.htm CHECK OUT THE NEW CALENDAR ----------------------------------------------------------------------
End of Volume 33 Issue 73