Volume 40 Number 22
                 Produced: Sun Jul 27  9:55:55 US/Eastern 2003


Subjects Discussed In This Issue: 

Modern Orthodoxy: definition (Chumras) (2)
         [Allen Gerstl, Binyomin Segal]


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From: Allen Gerstl <acgerstl@...>
Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2003 22:51:22 -0400
Subject: Re: Modern Orthodoxy: definition (Chumras)

On 15 Jun 2003 10:09:42 -0500 Binyomin Segal <bsegal@...> wrote: 

>On 7 Apr 2003 Allen Gerstl wrote about a particular type of chumra as
>being specific to the charedi community.
[AG:]
> > Yet we also have a recurring phrase "u-baal nefesh yachmir" (and someone
> > who cares about his soul will be stringent concerning the matter). This
> > concept of "baal nefesh yachmir" is I believe a hallmark of non-MO and
> > it is grounded on a particular view of the halacha. I believe that the
> > latter view is based upon speculation that there is a (Platonic-style)
> > absolute halacha.  Thus while a rav must pasken and his pesak IS the
> > halacha and it may be relied upon by the shoel (the questioner), from
> > the standpoint of an absolute halacha, the posek might be wrong. So
> > while by relying upon pesak, no culpable aveira might be committed if
> > the posek was wrong; on an absolute basis there might still be harm to
> > the neshama of the shoel (questioner).
                                     . . .
[Binyomin:]
>Ultimately, I think the problem I have is that Allen's reasoning for
>this type of chumra does not ring true for me and my experiences.
>...[I] do not believe that the
>meaning Allen assigns to these chumras is in fact the meaning that is
>being acted upon within the chareidi community.
>
>That is to say, while Allen may have identified a type of chumra that
>may be the "hallmark of non-MO", I do not believe it comes from a
>viewpoint that there is a "(Platonic-style) absolute halacha." I don't
>think this is an accurate reflection of the chareidi world view.
>
>After some reflection, I have found an alternative explanation for this
>chumra type ...  In some practical sense it
>may not be very different than the chumra type that Allen suggested,
>but I believe the underlying philosophy is very different.
>
>Allow me to quote from Silverstein's translation of Mesilat Yesharim,
>concerning the trait of saintliness pp217-19:
>
>"'Fortunate is the man whose toil is in Torah AND gives pleasure to his
>Creator.' [emphasis added-see later- AG]The underlying idea is this:        
>It is known which mitzvoth are
>binding on all of Israel....However, one who truly loves the
>Creator...will not endeavor and intend to fulfill his obligations by
>means of the DUTY which is acknowledged by all of Israel in general,
>but will react in very much the same manner as a son who loves his
>father, who, even if his father gives only a slight indication of
>desiring something, undertakes to fulfill this desire as completely as
>he can....>
>"...a comprehensive performance of all mitzvoth, embracing all of the
>relevant areas and conditions within the realm of possibility....
>
>I believe it is an attempt at saintliness - not an attempt to fulfill
>the "real" requirements of the law - which motivate the chareidi
>community (at least the ones that are motivated by appropriate
>motivations at all, but that is another whole discussion). Certainly
>this text is a standard mussar text of the charedi yeshiva. And it does
>fit in more comfortably with what I have been taught and learned within
>those institutions. We can certainly argue/discuss/disagree about any
>particular chumra and whether it is an appropriate attempt at
>saintliness. But I do think we will have a better understanding of the
>internal motives of the chareidi if we accept this explanation for
>chumras of this type.
>
>Any comments?

I much appreciate Binyomin's thoughful remarks.  Because I have only a
few sefarim in my office and because of time constraints I am writing
rather discursively and in many cases from memory.

By definition a "chumra" is a stringency that goes beyond the normative
halacha. Chumrot may become minhagim (customs) and then become binding
on an individual or a community as safek nedarim (possible vows) and
require hatarat nedarim (nullification of mistaken vows if then sought
to be discontinued in practice). This is codified in SA:YD 214 where a
differention is made between a chumra adopted as a siyag ve-geder (a
hedge and fence to prevent transgression) which requires hatarat nedarim
and a chumra adopted because of a mistake as to the actual halacha which
does not require hatarat nedarim. Rav Moshe Feinstein in Igrot Moshe
refers to the latter in a teshuva regarding a certain mistakenly
practiced Pesach stringency.

There are other reasons for chumrot, including one that I termed a
"Platonic-style" belief in an absolute Halacha, that is a belief that
there are objective absolute answers to halachic questions and therefore
that conventional halachic decisions and codifications might be wrong if
they differ from such absolute answers (notwithstanding that someone
would not be transgressing at all if he followed those decisions and
codifications). I base my understanding mainly upon material from a
lecture on the topic of the different approaches of Rishonim to
machloket (disagreement) in halacha given by Prof. Moshe Halberthal of
Hebrew U. and also on references in the book, Jewish Unity by Rabbi
Jonathan Sacks.  Rabbi Sacks refers to the differences between realism
and positivism. So instead of using my term of a "Platonic-approach" he
might refer to (Halachic) Realism - that there is an objective absolute
Halacha, while its opposite would be (Halachic) Positivism - that the
Halacha is what poskim say it is after they have followed the rules of
pesak -halachic decision-making. (There are no doubt positions inbetween
those two extremes.)

I have not more than briefly perused the references to the phrase
"u-baal nefesh yachmir" (and someone who cares about his soul would best
be stringent) that are found in the Bar Ilan disk; however it appears to
me that its use is more frequent among the more contemporary teshuvot.
I thus believe that my understanding of the meaning of that phrase is
correct in the context of the few teshuvot in Igrot Moshe that I had
previously read and my perusing of the Bar Ilan disk.  I believe that
this type of chumra has deep roots in the history of halachic thought
becoming more important after the Sanhedrin ceased sitting.
Nevertheless, as already stated this represents only one particular
hashkafa (view as to Jewish concepts).

Binyomin discusses what he believes predominantly underlies chumrot
among Chareidim - Chassidut as discussed in the Messilat Yesharim - the
wish to act not only according to the letter of the halacha but
according to what is considered the spirit of the halacha and thus to
fulfill the taam (purpose) of the mitzvot as completely as
possible. (Chassidut, AIUI, in the terminology of the Mesillat Yesharim
refers to Mitzvot Asei - positive commandments and "Perishut"
-abstinence- is the counterpart as to issurim - negative commandments;
but a goal of perishut is to lead to chassidut.)  I agree with him that
such chassidut is a reason for people being machmir but I also believe
that his reason and my own explanation intersect, with each being
another way for somone who believes in a particular philosophy as to
either the nature of Halacha or as to the taam (underlying reason) of a
mitzvah to perform mitzvot beyond the normative halacha.

In Jewish Unity, Rabbi Jonathan Sacks (another list member had suggested
that I look at Rabbi Sacks' website for his speaches, and although I
didn't find what I was looking for on his website the suggestion
triggered my memory of his book which I then partially reread) also
discusses chumrot in the context of the perceived need to preserve the
remnant of observant Jewry after the onslaught of Reform, secularism and
the Halocaust. Thus strictness was used to insulate Jews from the the
surrounding society's waywardness and from a loss of Jewish religiosity
caused in part by such modern society.

I think that a reading of the last page of volume 3 of Rav Dessler's
Michtav Me-Eliyahu (which has been previously discussed in this group)
supports the position that there were various horaot shaah propounded
after the Halocaust including what Rav Dessler mentions there where some
individuals wished to extablish a Yeshiva -that he refers to as a
Seminary and that offered some type of secular education or vocational
training. He counselled against the latter, not because of any inherent
issue of such being prohibited but because he and his colleagues
believed that a Torah-only school would afford a better chance of
replacing lost numbers of talmidei chachamim and notwithstanding that
the majority of those Yeshiva students who did not become great Torah
scholars would have been better served by the combined program.

Rabbi Sacks in Jewish Unity contrasts the chareidi approach with a more
open approach that while the latter may be more religiously hazardous by
its exposing of people to the contamination of secular society it is
also of some advantage by affording an opportunity to influence others
positively and of bringing a return to tradition by wayward Jews. He
refers to the observance of normative halachic standards as the
traditional manner of Jewish observance within groups while individuals
may choose as a matter of their own wishes to be chassidim.  He thinks
that we have managed to, B"H, at least partially overcome the ravages of
the past and that we can now more confidently return to the more
normative paths within Torah observance. As indicated such would not
preclude individuals from following the paths of Chassidut -including
those described in the Mesillat Yesharim, if so inclined.

I personally find both the Torah Im Derech Eretz (Torah and western
culture) and the Torah U-Mada (Torah with secular learning) approaches
as being much closer to my own personal affinities and I believe that
Centrists have a solid position within traditional Judaism (although I
am sure that the advocates of other hashkafot within the spectrum of
orthodox Judaism have no less solid positions).  I find numerous
supports for Centrist positions including the following: In Tiferet
Yisrael's commentary to Avot 1:16 he explains the phrase, "Ve-al tarbeh
le-asair umadot" (do not overly rely upon estimations- i.e.to take more
that the required amount in separating maaser) This is explained as a
principal of general application, that someone who is machmir
inappropriately (e.g. as to maaser) may as a consequence be
inappropriately meikil (leninent).

On the other hand I also note that within classical Jewish sources we
find praise for more extensive and intensive performance of certain
particular mitzvot asei (positive commandments). Those mitzvot have no
halachically defined limits of quantity or intensity. Thus we find
charity, Torah learning, and prayer etc. described in the first mishnah
in Peah as "devarim she-ein lahem shiur" (matters-mitzvot-that have no
lower or upper limits as to their fulfillment) and the mishnah continues
(as to certain mitzvot of that type) "ve-ha-karen kaiyemet la-hem
le-olam ha-bah" (and, figuratively, the principal remains to be enjoyed
in the world to come).

Rabbi Sachs in his book submits that a tolerant approach to differences
in hashkafa is the norm except when the primary underlying tenets of
Judaism, that define our tradition of observance, are involved; but
other areas of hashkafa, (but not of halacha) and in particular such as
may have been a matter of debate among the sages are open to differences
of opinion and belief.

KT
Eliyahu

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From: Binyomin Segal <bsegal@...>
Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2003 22:19:11 -0500
Subject: Re: Modern Orthodoxy: definition (Chumras)

It is, I think, particularly rewarding when ongoing conversation leads
people closer, and underscores areas of agreement. Allen Gerstl and I
have had an ongoing conversation about chumras and their underlying
motivations. In the most recent post by Allen, a number of points get
made that I would like to discuss, primarily to agree with them.

> There are other reasons for chumrot, including one that I termed a 
> "Platonic-style" belief in an absolute Halacha, that is a belief that 
> there are objective absolute answers to halachic questions and 
> therefore that conventional halachic decisions and codifications 
> might be wrong if they differ from such absolute answers 
> (notwithstanding that someone would not be transgressing at all if he 
> followed those decisions and codifications).

First, I want to clarify my position here. I never meant to imply that
this reason is NEVER true. Rather, that it was not the basis for the
overall acceptance of chumros in the chareidi community.

Certainly among poskim one finds the approach to chumros Allen mentions
here. Take for example the Mishna Brura's approach to the definition of
"public domain" for matters of shabbos. While he accepts that the
accepted practice and therefore the normative halacha requires 600,000
people to create a public domain, he remains skeptical, and suggests
that it is appropriate to be machmir.

> Binyomin discusses what he believes predominantly underlies chumrot 
> among Chareidim - Chassidut as discussed in the Messilat Yesharim - 
> the wish to act not only according to the letter of the halacha but 
> according to what is considered the spirit of the halacha and thus to 
> fulfill the taam (purpose) of the mitzvot as completely as possible. 
>...
>I agree with him that such 
> chassidut is a reason for people being machmir but I also believe 
> that his reason and my own explanation intersect, with each being 
> another way for somone who believes in a particular philosophy as to 
> either the nature of Halacha or as to the taam (underlying reason) of 
> a mitzvah to perform mitzvot beyond the normative halacha.

Absolutely. In fact, to take the example I used above, while it is true
that the Mishna Brura's justification for this chumra is Allen's, I
believe that the cultural underpinnings that encourage accepting the
Mishna Brura's chumra are mine. That is, Allen's theory and my own
clearly do intersect.

Allen goes on to make a related point:
> I personally find both the Torah Im Derech Eretz (Torah and western 
> culture) and the Torah U-Mada (Torah with secular learning) 
> approaches as being much closer to my own personal affinities and I 
> believe that Centrists have a solid position within traditional 
> Judaism (although I am sure that the advocates of other hashkafot 
> within the spectrum of orthodox Judaism have no less solid 
> positions).  I find numerous supports for Centrist positions 
> including the following: In Tiferet Yisrael's commentary to Avot 1:16 
> he explains the phrase, "Ve-al tarbeh le-asair  umadot"  (do not 
> overly rely upon estimations- i.e.to take more that the required 
> amount in separating  maaser) This is explained as a principal of 
> general application, that someone who  is machmir inappropriately 
> (e.g. as to maaser) may as a consequence be inappropriately meikil 
> (leninent).

What is particularly interesting about this point is that, at least in
theory, it is accepted within most of the chareidi community as well.
My rebbe used to drive this point home often. His most clear source was
the Shach's rules of psak where he explicitly states that it is
forbidden to be machmir in psak, because as a general rule it leads to a
kula. And my rebbe often put this concept into practice, even when it
meant that he was not as machmir as the rest of the charedi community
around him (in Jerusalem). Further, I have spoken to many poskim who are
clearly chareidi and who definitely consider this part of their psak
mandate. I do admit though, that the chareidi community as a social
organism tends to ignore this idea (often to the dismay of their own
poskim), and those of us who do use it consistently are somewhat
marginalized. In this regard however it is worth noting that the social
rules of chumra are not universal in the chareidi community. Things that
are "popular" chumros in Lakewood NJ are not at all on the table (thank
G-d) in Chicago IL. If I behaved in Lakewood, as I do here in Chicago,
no one would think of me as part of the chareidi community.  Here
however, I pass muster.

All that aside, the only person/group that I know of that does not
accept the theory of chumra leading to kula is Brisk. I once (many years
ago) mentioned this idea to Rav Moshe Meiselman. He was strongly opposed
to this concept, felt it entirely without merit. Although I did not get
the chance to clarify with him, some of his students suggested that
Brisk had a different approach to halacha. Perhaps someone here can
clarify.

binyomin

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End of Volume 40 Issue 22