Volume 59 Number 71
Produced: Thu, 04 Nov 2010 02:39:34 EDT
Subjects Discussed In This Issue:
Bowing at Borchu
[Steven Oppenheimer]
Halacha and technology (use of digital telephones on shabbat)
[Akiva Miller]
Halacha for Special Agents (4)
[Hillel (Sabba) Markowitz Orrin Tilevitz Elazar M. Teitz Chana Luntz]
Prohibition of intermarriage
[Josh Backon]
Sitting shiva for intermarried child (2)
[Ira L. Jacobson Josh Backon]
Telephones on Shabbos (2)
[Bernard Raab David Ziants]
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From: Steven Oppenheimer <steven.oppenheimer@...>
Date: Tue, Nov 2,2010 at 11:01 PM
Subject: Bowing at Borchu
Stuart Wise wrote (MJ 59#70):
> My understanding is that when saying borchu, you bow at borchu and stand
> straight by Hashem. Yet I seem many Yeshiva boys, and even adults, who
> remain bowed until after Hashem. Is there more than one custom for this?
The explanation that I heard is as follows:
It is HaShem who enables us to be able to stand straight (it is HaShem who
is Zokef Kefufim). So how do we demonstrate that HaShem enables us to stand
straight? By standing straight only after we mention HaShem's name, we
highlight that HaShem is Zokef Kefufim.
The custom as brought down in the Kol Bo is stated as Zokef BeShem (see also
Sh.Aruch. 113:7) Those who straighten up after HaShems's name interpret
this as I mentioned.
The prevalent custom, however, is to stand straight before one mentions
HaShem's name (See for example, Be'er Moshe 3:21). So Stuart is correct -
zokef BeShem according to most explanations means standing straight before
mentioning HaShem's name.
Steven Oppenheimer, D.M.D.
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From: Akiva Miller <kennethgmiller@...>
Date: Tue, Nov 2,2010 at 03:01 PM
Subject: Halacha and technology (use of digital telephones on shabbat)
David Tzohar (MJ 59#70) wrote:
> When electricity was discovered about 150 years ago the leading
> halachic decisors had to deal with a new technological phenomenon.
> This was a form of energy which was not combustion in the physical
> sense, yet resembled fire in that it produced heat and light. Could
> it be used on Shabbat for heating and cooking? The poskim realized
> that permitting the use of electricity would destroy Shabbat. The
> question was how to define something that didn't exist in the time
> of the building of the mishkan and therefore didn't fit in the
> framework of the 39 melachot.
I would prefer not to believe that any of those poskim chose to forbid
electricity simply because the alternative "would destroy Shabbat." Quite the
contrary, they searched the sources for precedents, and found examples, such as
a piece of iron which was considered to be actual fire if it was heated to a
point where it glowed. Based on those precedents, they issued their rulings,
confident that they did their best in applying ancient laws to a new reality.
That doesn't mean that they all came to the same conclusion. Nor am I saying
that any particular view is any more or less correct than any other. As the
technology developed, our understanding of it changed as well, and this would of
course influence what the poskim would say.
I have heard (though I have not seen it in writing) that Rav Shlomo Zalman
Auerbach said that - based on his *current* understanding of it - he would have
allowed electricity on Shabbos if he was around when it was first discovered,
but the poskim of the time had a different understanding and ruled it to be
forbidden, and that now that that ruling was accepted it has become an
unchangeable rule. I will concede that this *appears* similar to saying that we
cannot allow electricity because it is un-Shabbosdik, but if one understands the
mechanics of the legal system, it is really very different.
Akiva Miller
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From: Hillel (Sabba) Markowitz <sabbahillel@...>
Date: Tue, Nov 2,2010 at 03:01 PM
Subject: Halacha for Special Agents
Russell J Hendel <rjhendel@...> wrote (MJ 59#70):
> Nachman Ziskind (MJ 59#69), responding to my assertion (MJ 59#67) that Ester
> was a rape victim states:
>
>> Esther initially was taken to the harem against her will, yes, but - at the
>> time she approached the king to invite him to the feast - she offered herself
>> willingly to him, and thereby became forbidden to her husband.
>
> Really!?!?! If a women merely offers herself to a man she becomes prohibited
> to him? No! They have to actually do something. If the woman offers and the
> man says no (Happens all the time) she is not prohibited to him.
>
> True, Ester was worried that the wine meals would lead to intimacy. But it is
> EQUALLY likely (maybe more likely - a job for actuarial estimates:)) that
> Achashveirosh was the type that wanted novelty. He had enough of Ester. He now
> went on to new women. And in fact there was no intimacy.
>
> From the point of view of the discussion we are having: We are not seeking a
> heter (permissability) for Jewish women to flirt with terrorists to get
> information, we are seeking a heter for actual relations.
>
> There is no heter! There is no Biblical precedent.
I think that the point being made was that at the time the invitation
was extended, Esther had to deal with the probability that even though
Achashveros had not called for her, and she was risking death by
approaching him, he would intend to "finish what he had started" once
he accepted her. Thus, as far as she was concerned it was a full
seduction and would have been treated as such. The analysis of the
"pre-mission" circumstances would have been the same. It is as if the
terrorist tells the woman everything and then gets killed before the
end result. The discussion of whether or not to send her would not
change.
Hillel (Sabba) Markowitz
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From: Orrin Tilevitz <tilevitzo@...>
Date: Tue, Nov 2,2010 at 04:01 PM
Subject: Halacha for Special Agents
Mark Polster wrote (MJ 59#70), responding to David Tzohar (MJ 59#69):
>> There is a source for R' Shvat's idea that non-religious women should be
>> used in situations where their modesty would be compromised.
> I continue to be frustrated by those who attribute to R' Shvat that which
> he never wrote. Source notwithstanding, this may be David Tzohar's idea and
> may even be valid - but it is not asserted by R' Shvat.
The source of David Tzohar's post is my first post several weeks ago, quoting my
daughter whom Rav Shvat taught six years ago I believe Rav Shvat's written
article was published only recently. For all I know, Rav Shvat could have
changed his mind in the interim.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Elazar M. Teitz <remt@...>
Date: Tue, Nov 2,2010 at 09:01 PM
Subject: Halacha for Special Agents
Russell Hendel writes (MJ 59#70):
> Ester was worried that the wine meals would lead to intimacy. But it is
> EQUALLY likely (maybe more likely - a job for actuarial estimates:)) that
> Achashveirosh was the type that wanted novelty. He had enough of Ester. He now
> went on to new women. And in fact there was no intimacy.
> From the point of view of the discussion we are having: We are not seeking a
> heter (permissability) for Jewish women to flirt with terrorists to get
> information, we are seeking a heter for actual relations.
> There is no heter! There is no Biblical precedent.
Dr. Hendel did not cite his source for Achashveirosh's tiring of Esther. What
we _do_ know is that she had been summoned to him as recently as thirty-three
days before she extended the invitation to him for the party with Haman, and
that when she came to extend the invitation, the Megilla uses the same
expression to describe Achashveirosh's reaction to her that was used when he
first saw her -- "matz'a chein b'einav [she found favor in his eyes]." There
was also no source cited for the statement that "there was, in fact, no intimacy."
Esther's fear was not that the wine parties would lead to intimacy. It was that
her very approaching him to invite him would lead to it, and because she had
initiated any intimacy by enticing him (assuming, as is reasonable, that she
beautified herself before approaching him), her adultery would be consensual,
and not compelled, as it had been until that point. As Rashi comments on her
reply to Mordechai that "v'cha'asher avadti, avadti" (literally, "and if I
perish, I perish), it means that just as she was lost to her father's home, so
too she would now be lost to her husband because of that adultery.
Despite this possibility, she went. If there were no heter, how could she do
so? Apparently, Chazal [the Talmudic sages] felt that she was permitted to do
so, and thus in their understanding of the situation, this represents a Biblical
precedent.
EMT
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From: Chana Luntz <Chana@...>
Date: Wed, Nov 3,2010 at 07:01 PM
Subject: Halacha for Special Agents
David Tzohar (MJ 59#69) writes:
> There is a source for R' Shvat's idea that non-religious women should
> be used in situations where their modesty would be compromised.
>
> The Misnah Trumot 8:12 says that if the goyim capture a group of Jewish
> women and say to them "give over one of you and we will defile her and
> if not we will defile you all" let them all be defiled and do not give
> over one of Israel. The Yerushalmi Trumot 47:A says explicitly that this
> is only in the case where all of the women are unmarried virgins or married
> women. If one of them has already been "defiled" then she can be given up to
> the goyim in order to save the rest.
I confess I was surprised when I saw this reference (not what was quoted in
the name of the Mishna in Terumos, but what was then further quoted
according to the Yerushalmi), because it was not how I remembered it, and
while the Rema in Yoreh Deah siman 157 si'if aleph indeed brings "and so
with women if non-Jews say to them give us one of you and we will defile her
all should be defiled and do not give over a soul in Israel" he certainly
does not add any qualifier about it being different if they are married or
single.
Nor is such a distinction referred to in the Beis Yosef, and in fact, the
Kesef Mishna (ie Rav Yosef Karo's perush on the Rambam's Mishna Torah) in
Hilchos Yesodei Hatorah perek 4 halacha 5 says something that seems close to
the opposite - "even if one of them was defiled they should all be defiled
and do not hand over one of them, and it is not similar to that which is
said there [in the Yerushalmi] regarding a wafer of terumah that if there is
a wafer of terumah that has been defiled give over that wafer of terumah and
do not let the other wafers of terumah be defiled because a wafer of terumah
is different because it is completely defiled and what is there to add [in
terms of defilement] onto this, but a woman if she profaned herself one time
and was defiled by way of a sin, every time she sins and defiles herself
more she adds to her sin and this time [ie when they demand] there is no
distinction between her and between the pure and the kosher amongst them and
why would you force her and hand her over to them not according to her will
and anyway perhaps there has already been a thought of teshuva [repentance]
and she has turned from her evil way."
So I think that you are mistranslating the Yerushalmi. What the Yerushalmi
actually says, as I understand it, is not "if one of them has already been
defiled" but "if one of them is designated by them [ie signalled out by
name] they can hand her over and not let all of them be defiled".
Now this latter statement relates to an earlier machlokus [disagreement]
brought in that Yerushalmi. Because the earlier discussion is about the
case if the non Jews say "give us one of you and we will kill him and if not
we will kill you all" they must let themselves all be killed and not give
over one, but if they designate [ie signal out by name] one of them, they
can hand that person over and not all be killed, and about this there is a
machlokus between Rabbi Yochanan and Resh Lakish. Resh Lakish says that
they can hand him over only if he was chayav misa [liable to the death
penalty] like Sheva ben Bichri and Rabbi Yochanan says even if he was not
chayav misa like Sheva ben Bichri. This reference to Sheva ben Bichri is a
reference to the story in Shmuel Beis perek 20 - where Sheva ben Bichri
rebels against Dovid HaMelech and flees to a city and Yoav and his army
pursues him and besieges the city demanding him and a wise woman (identified
in the midrash as Serach bas Asher) persuades the city to kill Sheva ben
Bichri and hand his head over to Yoav. But of course Sheva ben Bichri was
liable for the death penalty according to halacha for rebelling against
Dovid HaMelech. So the machlokus appears to come down to, Resh Lakish
saying that one can only hand over an individual who is demanded by name if
you have independently verified that such a person is liable in halacha to
the death penalty and Rabbi Yochanan allows the handing over even if the
person has no such liability in halacha, merely the singling out is enough.
Now the usual rule is that we posken [rule] like Rabbi Yochanan over Resh
Lakish, but it is noteworthy that the Rambam in Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah
perek 5 halacha 5 poskens like Resh Lakish (and the Beis Yosef attempts to
give a rationale for this position). And hence the Rema brings both
positions, first the position that if a particular person is specified they
can be handed over, and as a yesh omrim that such a person cannot be handed
over unless they were in fact chayav misa like Sheva ben Bichri. And the
Taz there (si'if katan 9) states that in the case of the women and
defilement (which is brought right after this section in the Rema) that the
Beis Yosef brings in the name of the Ran that here too, if one woman is
specified she can be handed over.
> According to this it would be preferable to send non-religious women
> (assuming that they are unmarried and not virgins) on these missions
Well I don't think that the Yerushalmi that I have bears this out (unless
you have a different version of the Yerushalmi than I have, and, it would
seem, a different version than the rishonim would seem to have had). And
the position of the Kesef Mishna seems to lead to precisely the opposite -
namely that all women are equal in this. I do think though that as a
practical matter, if I was the intelligence officer choosing women (or men)
to carry out honeypot missions (or any dangerous mission), I would naturally
regard experience as a very important factor in my selection - worrying that
the less experience had, the more likely that the mission would fail. It
therefore seems eminently sensible to gravitate towards experience over
inexperience, and thus the mission would seem far more likely to go to the
former. That military pragmatic would seem to rule the vast majority of
religious women (and no doubt many not religious women) out of the equation.
Regards
Chana
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Josh Backon <backon@...>
Date: Wed, Nov 3,2010 at 04:01 AM
Subject: Prohibition of intermarriage
Shulchan Aruch YOREH DEAH 2:5 ("mumar l'hach'is afilu ledavar echad")
indicates that someone who deliberately violates a prohibition has the
halachic status of a gentile.
Cohabitation (for the sake of marriage) with a gentile is a biblical
prohibition (see: Chelkat Mechokek EVEN HA'EZER 16:5) and is punishable
by *karet* since it is a public act (see also Maharam Shick EH 155).
Already in Tanach we see how the prophet Malachi (2:11) deemed intermarriage
"bagda Yehuda v'to'evah ne'esta b'yisrael u'beyerushalayim; ki chilal
yehuda kodesh hashem asher ahev u'va'al bat el nechar": a major desecration
of God's name (chilul hashem).
The Rambam (Hilchot Issurei Biah 12:1) rules like R. Shimon bar Yochai in the
Gemara (AZ 36b) that the prohibition of intermarriage is *biblical* even if the
gentile is not one of the 7 Nations (as per Deuteronomy 7:3). See also the Beit
Yosef in TUR Even Ha'ezer 16 (who rules like the Rambam) and the Shulchan Aruch
Even Ha'Ezer 16:1 especially the Taz there (s"k 2) quoting the Semag and the
Meharshal. Also the Minchat Chinuch 427 d"h shelo l'hitchaten.
Those who deliberately intermarry have placed themselves outside the fold.
The Iggrot Moshe OC III 12 holds that those who are *kofrim mamash* are not
eligible to get an *aliya* to the Torah.
Josh Backon
<backon@...>
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From: Ira L. Jacobson <laser@...>
Date: Tue, Nov 2,2010 at 04:01 PM
Subject: Sitting shiva for intermarried child
Marc Yunis stated the following (MJ 59#70):
> We have all heard of the practiceof "sitting sh'va" for a child who
> has married out of the faith. Has anyone actually witnessed this
> event? If so, without revealing the identity of the family, can you
> tell us the circumstances.
I don't have a source at hand right now, but I understand that the
issue is different from what is ordinarily presented.
The actual question was whether one should sit shiva for an
intermarried relative WHEN THAT RELATIVE DIES, and not when he enters
into a forbidden relationship.
~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~=
IRA L. JACOBSON
=~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~
mailto:<laser@...>
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From: Josh Backon <backon@...>
Date: Tue, Nov 2,2010 at 05:01 PM
Subject: Sitting shiva for intermarried child
Marc Yunis asked (MJ 59#70):
> We have all heard of the practice of "sitting sh'va" for a child who
> has married out of the faith. Has anyone actually witnessed this event?
> If so, without revealing the identity of the family, can you tell us the
> circumstances.
I haven't witnessed such an event but it is based on halacha. See: Sefer
Chasidim Siman 190 ("raui livkot"); Beit Yosef TUR Yoreh Deah 354;
Aruch Hashulchan YD 354 #7; Levush 354 s'if 6; Chochmat Adam Klal 155 s'if 6;
Tzitz Eliezer Chelek 5, Ramat Rachel Siman 42.
Josh Backon
<backon@...>
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Bernard Raab <beraab@...>
Date: Tue, Nov 2,2010 at 04:01 PM
Subject: Telephones on Shabbos
Robert Schoenfeld wrote (MJ 59#70):
> As as telecommunications engineer I can definitely say that just about
> all modern phones use gramma switches and that no lights are turned on in a
> telephone central office when a phone goes off hook. HOWEVER just because
> this is so does not mean we should use a telephone on Shabbos for any
> reason except in emergencies. Its use would still be not shabbosdick.
Thank you Bob for an authoritative response. I think we would all agree that one
of the most valued features of Shabbos is the absence of electronic
communications for that period -- the withdrawal from the hectic world of
constant demands on our time, to a 24-hour period of quiet contemplation once
every week. What a gift that is.
Yet, I think it is important to recognize that some restrictions are more
arbitrary than others, and can create unecessary hardship. I am thinking about
the question that ignited this discussion, in which the poster described the
case of a sick person whose illness was not life-threatening, but who could have
gotten some relief from suffering if they would have been allowed to call the
doctor for a prescription. He was asking whether a digital telephone might be
more permissable than the older analog technology. For such a case and for such
a person, Bob's response could be decisive.
I reason as follows: It is widely agreed that telephones are prohibited
rabbinically, certainly once the issue of lights being triggered in a central
switching station was obviated many years ago, when all switching became
electronic, with no moving parts or possibility of sparking, etc. What Bob
reveals above is that in today's technology, random delays are built into the
system as well, such that it is far from the cause-and-direct-effect situation
like talking into a microphone which then drives a loudspeaker. Thus the
"gramma" heter may apply, in which case the principle of "shvus-d'shvus" might
make any call totally mutar. Armed with this knowledge, our poster might have
felt comfortable making that call to his doctor.
In writing the analogy to the microphone-loudspeaker situation, I am reminded of
our earlier discussion on precisely this issue: In the 1940's and 50's, the
argument about the use of loudspeakers in shul on Shabbos was raging. The
majority or poskim were ruling issur, but some powerful forces were questioning
this ruling: Rav Soloveitchik privately ruled mutar, if turned on before Shabbos
and left undisturbed, and Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach was clearly inclined to
rule similarly on technical grounds, but decided that he could not oppose the
"mesorah". It was clear from that point on that this restriction was rabbinic in
nature.
Bernie R.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: David Ziants <dziants@...>
Date: Wed, Nov 3,2010 at 04:01 AM
Subject: Telephones on Shabbos
Robert Schoenfeld <frank_james@...> wrote (MJ 59#70):
> As as telecommunications engineer I can definitely say that just about
> all modern phones use gramma switches and that no lights are turned on
> in a telephone central office when a phone goes off hook.
Please could you elaborate on "all modern phones use gramma switches".
Does this put Machon Zomet (who design special phones with g'ramma
[indirect] mechanisms for use in army,medical etc.) out of business?
The context of the discussion is a situation of a medical or security
emergency that is not life critical. If life or death issue then
everything is permitted on Shabbat. I don't think anyone is suggesting
the use of a phone for non-emergencies.
David ZIants
Ma'aleh Adumim, Israel
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End of Volume 59 Issue 71
