Volume 61 Number 51
Produced: Fri, 09 Nov 2012 06:58:58 EST
Subjects Discussed In This Issue:
Do not Show Them Favour (2)
[Frank Silbermann Chana Luntz]
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From: Frank Silbermann <frank_silbermann@...>
Date: Thu, Nov 8,2012 at 11:01 AM
Subject: Do not Show Them Favour
Barak Greenfield wrote (MJ 61#50) in reply to Chana Luntz (MJ 61#47):
> But the Ramban in the Mishneh Torah clearly holds that it applies to all ovdei
> kochavim, as does the Rashba cited. Tosfos (Avoda Zara 20a, d'amar kra) also
> holds that it applies to all ovdei kochavim. And you would then have to
> determine (except for the Rashba) whether they meant ovdei kochavim literally,
> or all nochrim, and if the former, postulate that Christians today are not
> ovdei avoda zara, which is a whole other discussion with opinions on either
> side.
Yes, this is what we must consider _whenever_ we see something in halacha that
refers to ovdei kochavim.
>> And in the Beis Yosef (Choshen Mishpat Siman 249) the Shulchan Aruch writes:
>> "And that which Tosphos asks ..."
>
> I'm not sure why you omitted the first part of the Beis Yosef where he explains
> that there's a machlokes in the gemara, and he paskens according the opinion
> that we may give (gratis) to a ger toshav, but to an akum (implying all other
> nochrim) we may only sell (the gemara is talking about meat improperly
> slaughtered and hence not consumable by the Yehudi).
And since "akum" refers to ovdei kochavim umazalos (thereby indicating worship
not only of the stars but _also_ of the constellations), all the more so do we
have to determine whether this refers to ovedei kochavim umazalos literally or
all nochrim. Perhaps the Beis Yosef is just giving the smooth cases and
remaining silent about cases under dispute.)
>> Now in the case of giving presents to an individual in a place like America
>> - how often does it ever come up that you have a situation that can
>> genuinely be considered a case of a gift that does *not* fall within either
>> the category of being acquainted with the person in question, or it being a
>> situation of darchei shalom. But by not elaborating on these two exceptions
>> (even though they are referred to in the piece) a misleading impression is
>> given.
>
> It comes up very frequently -- in the case of anonymous gifts. These don't
> benefit the Yehudi in any way, nor do they effectuate darchei shalom.
I heard of a talumudic discussion arguing that a Jew who gives tzedakah in the
hope that a person will be healed is considered righteous because he would not
consider the money wasted even if a healing does not occur, whereas a gentile
who gives tzedakah is considered a sinner because he gives _only_ for the sake
of a benefit. I wonder how we should relate this concept to the view that we
should not give gifts to a gentile -- even if he's not an idol-worshipper --
unless we as individuals or the Jewish people in general receive a benefit.
Frank Silbermann Memphis, Tennessee
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From: Chana Luntz <Chana@...>
Date: Thu, Nov 8,2012 at 08:01 PM
Subject: Do not Show Them Favour
Barak Greenfield wrote in MJ 61#50:
> Chana Luntz wrote (MJ 61#47), commenting on the Weekly Halacha Discussion
> by Rabbi Doniel Neustadt (MJ 61#46):
>> To start with the concluding paragraph, since this is the one that
>> leaves one with a final impression:
...
>> i.e. the start being - it is all due to being overly influenced by the
>> wider society, not by halachic norms and different halachic positions.
> He didn't start with that thought, he ended with it. He was either melamed
> zechus for those who are meikel or was attempting to explain a phenomenon
> sociologically. As you say, it was the concluding paragraph; it was not
> "the start."
I think you are misunderstanding my language here. When I used the language
"the start being..." I meant "the position he is starting from" - ie his
basic premise which can otherwise be defined as the "assertion or
proposition which forms the basis for a work or theory". Maybe it is an
American/English thing, but it still seems clear enough to me, especially as
I had, as you quote, indicated that this quote came from Rabbi Neustadt's
concluding paragraph. Ie to me the concluding paragraph gave the greatest
indication of the assertion or proposition which formed the basis of Rabbi
Neustadt's theory throughout the piece, the place where, in terms of
thinking, he started. But as they say, England and America are two
countries divided by a common language (and I am originally an Australian in
any event), and it may not have been so clear to others.
>>> Possibly, those who are lax follow the opinion of the Rishonim (13)
>>> who maintain that this halacha applies only to non-Jews who are
>>> active idol worshippers (14).
>> Yes indeed, that is one position to bear in mind, for which he quotes
>> - (13) Rambam, Sefer Hamitzvos 50; Teshuvos Rashba 1:8; Sefer
>> Hachinuch 426; Meiri, Avodah Zarah 20a. He then quotes (14) See Torah
>> Temimah, Devorim 7:2, who suggests that these halachos apply only to
>> the Gentiles of the Seven Nations. But he does not make it clear that
>> it is not only the Torah Temima who says so - but the Hameiri (Avoda
>> Zara 20a) and Rabad (Hilchot Avoda Zara 10:6),
> But the Ramban in the Mishneh Torah clearly holds that it applies to all
> ovdei kochavim, as does the Rashba cited. Tosfos (Avoda Zara 20a, d'amar kra)
> also holds that it applies to all ovdei kochavim.
I am not disputing that the majority of Rishonim held that it has more
general application than the seven nations. What I did not like about this
piece was twofold:
a) the only source he quotes for holding that it applies only to the seven
nations is the Torah Temima - an acharon, and a late one at that (not to
mention one that is not frequently quoted as a halachic heavyweight).
Whereas it is in fact a machlokus rishonim, as well as being held by numbers
of other acharonim, even if it is not the majority opinion.
b) the only possible reason he can hold for "being lax" (note the language)
is that the people "being lax" hold that it only applies to those non-Jews
who are not "active idol worshippers".
Whereas there are various possible reasons for acting as people do:
a) they rely on the minority of Rishonim that it only applies to the seven
nations;
b) they hold that it only applies to those non-Jews who are active idol
worshippers (not even including to those who are only performing acts of
idol worship because it is "minhag avosehem v'yadehem - the custom of their
fathers"), this being yet another group of Rishonim, but also a minority
opinion;
c) they hold that it does not apply to groups of non-Jews who have done more
than not be active idol worshippers, they have as a nation or group
renounced idol worship; or
d) they hold it applies but that the circumstances in which it would apply
just never come up in cases where R Neustadt sees it coming up (because the
exceptions are wider than he sees them).
> And you would then have to determine (except for the Rashba) whether they
> meant ovdei kochavim literally, or all nochrim, and if the former, postulate
> that Christians today are not ovdei avoda zara, which is a whole other
> discussion with opinions on either side.
Yes, for c), no for the others.
>>> Shulchan Aruch however does not follow this opinion and clearly rules
>>> that the laws derived from Lo Sechaneim apply to all non-Jews, including
>>> Muslims who are not idol worshippers; the only exception would be a
>>> non-Jew who became a ger toshav in the times of the Sanhedrin (15).
>> Yes and yet not quite.
> Yes, and explicitly so, as you then quote:
>> Choshen Mispat siman 249 si'if 2:
>> "An oved cochavim who is not a ger toshav, it is forbidden to give him
>> a present unless he is acquainted with him or if there is in it a
>> matter of darchei shalom."
> That's pretty clear, and also obvious that it's referring to any nochri,
> even not an active idol worshipper, except a ger toshav.
It is pretty clear that the Shulchan Aruch himself ruled against a) and b)
in my list which is what I was acknowledging. The reason I gave of "not
quite" is because the Shulchan Aruch itself that he quotes gives two
exceptions - being acquainted with the relevant non-Jew and darchei shalom.
The way it was written it gave the impression that these two did not apply
and certainly members of this list understood it that way, one of them even
asking does not darchei shalom trump, which of course it does, very
explicitly. In my view, and as borne out by the comments, most people
reading the piece went away with the impression that these exceptions did
not exist, or were so watered down as to be relatively uncommon.
It is not at all clear what the Shulchan Aruch held regarding (c), because
those who argue for (c) argue that the Shulchan Aruch (in the form of the
Kesef Mishna) understands an entire nation which renounces idol worship as
being in the category of gerei toshav, and that the halachic requirement for
the kabala before beis din (which was discontinued with the Yovel) is only
needed for the requirement to support such people, not for their status when
taken on as a whole nation. This is a complicated argument, however, and it
was not that, but the lack of clear acknowledgement of the two explicit
exceptions that made the piece, to my mind, misleading, even though the
source quote was correct and there were allusions to these exceptions
elsewhere in the piece.
>> And in the Beis Yosef (Choshen Mishpat Siman 249) the Shulchan Aruch writes:
>> "And that which Tosphos asks ..."
> I'm not sure why you omitted the first part of the Beis Yosef where he explains
> that there's a machlokes in the gemara, and he paskens according the opinion
> that we may give (gratis) to a ger toshav, but to an akum (implying all other
> nochrim) we may only sell (the gemara is talking about meat improperly
> slaughtered and hence not consumable by the Yehudi).
Because that would have made it over long - and I thought I had already made
it clear that I agreed with Rav Neustadt that the Shulchan Aruch himself
held like those who felt the prohibition was more generally applicable than
the seven nations or active idol worshippers, so there was no need to bring
the machlokus. What needed further explanation was the two exceptions, so
that it could be seen that the Beis Yosef's view of the two exceptions was
extremely wide.
>> Now in the case of giving presents to an individual in a place like America
>> - how often does it ever come up that you have a situation that can
>> genuinely be considered a case of a gift that does *not* fall within
>> either the category of being acquainted with the person in question,
>> or it being a situation of darchei shalom. But by not elaborating on
>> these two exceptions (even though they are referred to in the piece) a
>> misleading impression is given.
> It comes up very frequently -- in the case of anonymous gifts.
I don't know about you, but I can't think of any anonymous gifts I have
given to anybody (let's talk about Jews for a moment) that would not fall
within darchei shalom or being acquainted with the person. Remember we are
not talking about gifts to tzedaka, which are clearly permitted even by Rav
Neustadt. So where does this occur: let's say there is a custom in your
office that everybody draws a name out of a hat and gives a gift to that
person anonymously. But while the gift giver may remain anonymous - the gift
giver has to at least have some knowledge of the recipient, and also if he
or she refuses to take part, there is a darchei shalom problem, and if he is
the only one who doesn't actually give after going along with the draw, the
finger will get pointed at him eventually, causing darchei shalom problems.
Remember according to the Beis Yosef (and this is why I brought the Beis
Yosef I did bring), even somebody who happens to accompany a person on a
trip, even if one does not know their name and one has never met that person
before in their life, falls within the category of being acquainted. So I
genuinely struggle to think of a case in which such gifts occur in real
life, unless you really read down the exceptions. Can you give a real life
example of the kind of gift that is genuinely anonymous (ie you don't know
the recipient) and is not tzedaka and that is given on a frequent basis?
> These don't benefit the Yehudi in any way, nor do they effectuate darchei
> shalom. It is also important to note that Rabbi Neustadt's list of
> circumstances in which gift-giving is permissible is quite in sync with
> this Beis Yosef -- i.e., if you know the nochri, or if your giving him the
> gifts will benefit the Yehudi. This list is quite prominent in the article,
> so your criticism for "not elaborating" on them and your statement about a
> "misleading impression" are unfair.
This is I think where we fundamentally disagree. To my mind Rav Neustadt's
list comprises a very narrow understanding of the two exceptions. Once you
take such a narrow understanding, that leaves a large area that is not
covered for people to be "lax" in and for Rav Neustadt to observe people
being lax in. If on the other hand you understand the two exceptions the way
I believe they are written, which are rather wide, there are very few
circumstances when people will ever fall outside of them, making this mostly
an irrelevant question in practice.
>> So, how did Rav Kook, Rav Hertzog and all those who support the heter
>> mechira (such as Rav Ovadiah Yosef) deal with this question?
> They relied on minority opinions in the Rishonim about lo sechoneim
> generally, plus heterim that applied specifically to the "no transfer of
> land" part of the halacha, such as it being for the benefit of Jews'
> settling the land, in order to make a yishuv and/or medinah possible. Do you
> find where they say that, in general, a Yehudi can give a nochri a free
> (anonymous) gift?
No, they rely fundamentally on the idea that a nation that has abandoned
idol worship falls within the category of ger toshav - except that we are
not obligated to sustain them until they do a formal kabala before beis
din, but that the prohibition on selling the land no longer applies. Since I
believe that the situation of needing to give a nochri a free anonymous gift
virtually never exists in practice, outside of tzedaka, I don't believe it
is a real practical halachic question that anybody would need to answer.
But at least in theory, if you read Rav Hertzog in Tchuka L'Yisrael al pi
HaTorah - he would indeed clearly hold that if it were ever relevant. Rav
Kook I agree is less clear.
> Rabbi Neustadt didn't talk about the heter mechirah. Your attempt to paint
> his article with the brush of "charedi" (as if that were a bad thing) because
> it incidentally gives weight to the opinions prohibiting the heter mechira is
> improper. There are many arguments for and against the heter mechirah and
> the issue of lo sechoneim is just one of them.
Yes, that is true. But if you hold by Rabbi Neustadt's understanding of lo
sechoneim, then you are perforce against the heter mechira. On the other
hand, because there are as you say many arguments for and against the heter
mechira you can still be against the heter mechira and not accept Rabbi
Neustadt's position. The fact that Rabbi Neustadt's understanding of lo
sechoneim pushes anybody who supports the heter mechira (including Rav Kook
and Rav Hertzog) into the group of people whose "laxity can be partially
attributed to the Great American Melting Pot (multiculturalism in other
places} and to the influence of the society and secular media to which we
are constantly exposed" ought to give people at least some pause that
*maybe* there are halachic positions other than the ones set out in his
piece. It is that which I was objecting to - the logical conclusion that
anybody who falls within the category of accepting the validity of the heter
mechira is in Rabbi Neustadt's words "lax". Not that there are not other
great rabbonim who did not support the heter mechira.
>> Again, while the relevant sources are quoted, there is a slant here in
>> favour of a more "Torah only" view.
> What view would you propose to take in a discussion of halacha?
I included the term "Torah only" in quotation marks, to show I am referring
to the hashkafic [philosophical] position that holds itself up as against
the "Torah im derech eretz" or "Torah u'madda" hashkafic position and
therefore likes to call itself "Torah only". Rabbi Neustadt is clearly
operating out of a particular hashkafic position which consequentially
involves taking certain halachic positions in various machlokusim. People
with different hashkafic positions to his generally take different halachic
positions in relation to various machlokusim.
Most people are aware of this use of labels to easily encapsulate these
various positions - however your statement appears to suggest that this
terminology is unfamiliar to you, so let me rephrase. "Again, while the
relevant sources are quoted, there is a slant here in favour of a particular
hashkafic view, which then plays itself out as assuming that this reading of
the sources is the only legitimate halachic reading of the sources. However
there are other halachic positions which form the basis of other hashkafic
views, which hashkafic views are only valid halachically if one does not
read the sources the way Rav Neustadt does." Clearer now?
>> And of course again there has to be another side. Because the Torah im
>> derech eretz world in its widest expression, and the philosophy of
>> RSRH and those who follow and expand on him involves embracing the
>> best of the non-Jewish world.
> That's not "another side." Are you suggesting that Rav Hirsch didn't take a
> "Torah only" view of halacha,
Yes, when you use the term "Torah only" as shorthand for a particular
hashkafic viewpoint that disagrees with RSRH (as I did). RSRH understood
his hashkafic position as being in consonance with halacha (do you dispute
this)? Those with the hashkafic viewpoint I have called in shorthand "Torah
only" (because those who hold it usually call it this) hold that RSRH was
wrong in halacha, and hence wrong in hashkafa. But if it confuses you too
much to use the term with quotation marks to summarise this particular
hashkafic position, I will change it and say - "in order for RSRH to hold,
as he did, that it is hashkafically OK or even praiseworthy to learn from
the nochrim and embrace their culture, he had to learn the halachic sources
(and he did) differently from the way that Rabbi Neustadt learns them,
otherwise what he was advocating is assur [forbidden]. Many of those who
argue against RSRH's path indeed use an explanation of the sources in line
with that of Rabbi Neustadt to argue that RSRH's hashkafic path is
halachically forbidden." Is that clearer?
> Parenthetically, it is ironic that you cited Rav Hirsch as being on the
> "other side", knowing that he was opposed to the heter mechirah. I wonder
> what "camp" he falls into.
The camp whose philosophy is held to be halachically assur or at least lax
by Rav Neustadt. The fact that other rabbonim with completely different
hashkafos also fall within the group of those who are rendered lax by Rabbi
Neustadt does not mean that they necessarily agree with themselves inter-se.
>> if you follow the narrow reading advocated by R' Neustadt, Chazal and
>> prominent rishonim such as the Rambam violate an issur d'orisa.
> These questions have been asked and answered over and over. For example, the
> Rambam had high regard for the philosophy espoused by Aristotle, but wasn't
> personally praising the individual.
Have you ever read Moreh Nevuchim?
> To suggest that the plain meaning of the Rambam and Shulchan Aruch has Chazal
> (and the Rambam himself!) violating an issur d'oraisa is a bit far-reaching.
That is precisely the question with which the Tzitz Eliezer grapples in the
quoted teshuva. The question is a real question (that is precisely why
these questions have been asked over and over as you state, teshuvos don't
generally deal with the blatantly obvious). There are ways of answering the
question which result in a very narrow understanding of the exceptions to lo
sechoneim and there are ways of answering the question which result in a
very wide understanding of the exceptions to lo sechoneim. Rabbi Neustadt
take the former. I felt it would have been less problematic if he had made
it clearer that indeed those who take the latter exist and are not just
"lax".
> One wonders if you would have found his accurate article so problematic had
> you shared his world view.
I hope so, although it is of course very hard to be sure. On another list I
have been trying to explain to people the halachic reasoning of those who
hold like the Munkatcher that the concept of tinok shenishba [a child
captured amongst the nations] does not apply to most of the cases to which
it is applied today. That is not a world view I hold, but I do think it
important to understand the Beis Shammai's of this world; it is a logically
and internally consistent position - even if, in my view, it is not the
dominant position today. But similarly if the conversation were reversed,
and somebody was arguing solely for the Munkatcher's position on a list like
this one, I would find that problematic because it was excluding from the
idea of elu v'elu all those who rely upon the Binyon Tzion, and so I would
be unhappy if somebody who took the Munkatcher's position insisted that
everybody else was just simply "lax".
Regards
Chana
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End of Volume 61 Issue 51
